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Abstract 
 Epistemic evaluation is often appropriately prescriptive in character because 
believers are capable of exercising some kind of control—call it doxastic control—over 
the way in which they regulate their beliefs.  An intuitively appealing and widely endorsed 
account of doxastic control—the immediate causal impact account—maintains that a 
believer exercises doxastic control when her judgments about how she ought to regulate 
her beliefs in a particular set of circumstances can cause the believer to actually regulate 
her beliefs in those circumstances as she judges she ought to.  I show here that the 
immediate causal impact account is ultimately untenable.  Nevertheless, the immediate 
causal impact account gets something important about the nature of doxastic control 
right: exercising doxastic control involves being such that one’s conception of ideal belief 
regulation somehow shapes the way in which one actually regulates one’s beliefs.  Thus, I 
develop here an alternative account according to which, insofar as she exercises doxastic 
control, a believer’s conception of ideal belief regulation shapes the way in which she 
actually believes by exerting causal power directly on her dispositions to regulate her 
beliefs in certain ways.  I defend this alternative against other competitors by showing that 
it can be extended to supply a unified account of rational control that explains evaluation 
with respect to the various different norms of rationality that govern the way in which we 
form, revise, and sustain not only our beliefs, but also our intention, hopes, fears, etc. is 
often appropriately prescriptive. 
Introduction  
If I say that a particular thermostat ought to turn on the heater when the ambient 
temperature drops below 65 degrees, I am describing a standard of proper functioning 
that governs the thermostat’s operation.  But I am not instructing the thermostat to 
operate in this way, nor am I providing the thermostat with guidance or advice.  My 
statement that the thermostat ought to turn on the heater when the temperature drops 
below 65 degrees does not tell the thermostat how to respond to the ambient 
temperature.  
The epistemic ‘ought,’ however, is often used to express guidance or advice 
regarding how to form, revise, or sustain one’s beliefs.  Evaluation with respect to 
epistemic standards—and, in particular, with respect to standards of epistemic rationality 
or justification—is often naturally interpreted as instructing or directing its target to 
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reason in certain ways and not others.  Thus, the epistemic ‘ought’ is often prescriptive, 
rather than merely evaluative.1,2 
Why is the epistemic ‘ought’ different in this regard from the ‘ought’ of proper 
functioning that applies to the operation of a thermostat?3  Plausibly, one reason is that it 
makes no sense to give instructions to someone or something that is thoroughly incapable 
of adjusting its performance in response to those instructions.  And a thermostat’s 
operation can never be responsive to or guided by the instructions, directions, or advice 
that might be embedded in a claim about how it ought to operate.  Advice, guidance, or 
direction presupposes that its target is (at least in normal circumstances) capable of 
following or being guided by its recommendations.4  This suggests that the fact that a 
believer is capable of changing the way she regulates her beliefs in response to and in a 
way that is guided by epistemic praise or criticism explains (at least in part) why she is an 
appropriate target of prescriptive evaluation for believing as she does.5  Put in other 
terms, it is the fact that a believer can exercise some yet-to-be-specified kind of control 
over either the content of her beliefs or over the processes that regulate them that explains 
(at least in part) why she is appropriately subject to epistemic evaluation that is 
                                                
1 Certainly epistemic evaluation that takes the form of praise or criticism with respect to standards of 
epistemic rationality or justification marks the fact that a believer has either met or fallen short of these 
standards in believing as she does.  My point here is that this sort of epistemic evaluation is often more than 
a mere tool for marking whether or not a believer manages to live up to these epistemic standards. Rather, 
this evaluation is just evaluation that has directive or instructive import.  The prescriptive ‘ought’ supplies 
advice or guidance.  And normative claims that employ the prescriptive ‘ought’ tell someone or something 
how to be, how to act, or how to perform.  This is what differentiates prescriptive evaluation from 
evaluation that merely reports whether or not its target conforms to a particular normative standard that 
governs it. 
2 The prescriptive/merely evaluative distinction that I draw here cuts across the ought-to-be/ought-to-do 
distinction to which Chrisman appeals in his (2008).  Nothing in what follows turns on whether the kind of 
genuinely prescriptive epistemic evaluation on which I’ve focused my attention here—evaluation with 
respect to standards of rationality or justification—is understood as evaluation with respect to ought-to-bes 
(rules of criticism) or ought-to-dos (rules of action).  Additionally, I remain agnostic regarding how this 
distinction is properly captured by a theoretical semantics of ‘ought’ (for a helpful discussion of the debate 
on this point, see Chrisman (2012)). 
3 This question is especially pressing if, as some epistemologists suggest, epistemic standards or norms have 
roughly the same kind of normative structure as the standards of proper functioning that govern e.g. 
thermostat operation, heartbeats, human perception, or animal cognition (see, for example, Sosa (2009) or 
Kornblith (2002)).   
4 This is why epistemic evaluation that is genuinely prescriptive in character seems confused, misguided, or 
misplaced when its target is a believer who, perhaps because of some deficiency or defect in her cognitive 
capacities, is systematically incapable of regulating her beliefs differently from the way in which she does.  
Of course, such a believer might well be appropriately subject to non-prescriptive epistemic evaluation.   
5 One other part of a complete explanation of when and why believers are appropriately subject to 
prescriptive epistemic evaluation in virtue of the way in which they believe must be an explanation of why 
believers fall under the scope of epistemic standards—i.e. of why epistemic norms have authority over the 
way in which believers believe—in the first place.  For the purposes of this paper, I will simply assume that, 
somehow, epistemic standards do have the requisite sort of authority over the way in which we believe. 
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prescriptive, rather than merely evaluative, in character.6  Call the relevant kind of 
control, whatever it turns out to involve,  doxastic control.  So, doxastic control is that which 
ensures that a believer is capable of responding to, following, or taking up and putting 
into practice instructions, directions, or advice regarding how she ought to regulate her 
beliefs.  If a believer lacks the capacity to exercise doxastic control, then she is not 
appropriately subject to evaluation with respect to standards of epistemic rationality or 
justification that is genuinely prescriptive in character.  And the fact that we typically 
exercise doxastic control explains why we are typically appropriate targets of prescriptive 
epistemic evaluation.  
Thus, the real work of explaining when and why the epistemic ‘ought’ is genuinely 
prescriptive lies in giving an account of doxastic control.  The aim of this paper is to 
develop and defend such an account.   
1. The Simple Account: Control as Immediate Causal Impact 
Perhaps the most intuitive and certainly the most widely endorsed account of 
doxastic control is what I call here the immediate causal impact account.  Put roughly, 
the immediate causal impact account of doxastic control maintains that we exercise 
doxastic control if and only if our judgments about how we ought to believe in a 
particular set of circumstances cause us to actually believe in the ways that we judge we 
ought to believe in those circumstances.7   
Of course, proponents of the immediate causal impact account accept that we do 
not always, or even typically, make judgments about how we ought to believe in the 
course of actually forming, revising, or maintaining our beliefs.  Much of our belief 
regulation occurs automatically and unreflectively.  Still, we are capable of making 
normative judgments about how we ought to believe in the circumstances with which we 
are faced.  The immediate causal impact account maintains that a believer who exercises 
doxastic control is just a believer who is such that, when she does make such judgments, 
her judgments causally determine how she actually believes.  As a first gloss, that a 
believer exercises doxastic control in now believing that P requires that, if she were to 
judge that she ought not now believe that P, then her judgment would cause her not to 
now believe that P.  More carefully, that a believer exercises doxastic control in believing 
as she now does requires that, were the believer to make a certain sort of judgment about 
how she ought to now believe, her judgment would, itself, causally determine the way in 
                                                
6 The notion of control is closely linked to the notions of freedom, agency, and responsibility.  Although I 
focus exclusively on the notion of control in this paper, I do think that the applicability of the prescriptive 
‘ought’ (both in the epistemic domain and elsewhere) is tied to the applicability of a certain form of 
responsibility, and presupposes both a certain kind of freedom and the capacity to exercise a certain sort of 
agency on the part of the evaluative subject.  In future work, I hope to employ the particular account of 
doxastic control that I defend in what follows to explicate both the nature of our doxastic freedom, and the 
sense in which, as Boyle suggests in his (2011), we exercise a kind of agency in believing. 
7 Although I will not mark this explicitly in the text, the normative judgments to which I refer here and 
below when discussing doxastic control express a believer’s own conception of ideal belief-regulation and so 
these normative judgments always employ the epistemic ‘ought.’ 
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which she would actually now believe.  And, if the immediate causal impact account is 
right, then a believer is appropriately subject to prescriptive epistemic evaluation in virtue 
of how she believes in a particular case only when either the way in which she believes 
actually is causally determined by her judgment(s) about how she ought to believe in the 
case in question or the way in which she believes would have been so determined, had she 
made the relevant sort of judgment.   
There are a variety of different ways in which one might understand the 
mechanism via which certain of a believer’s normative judgments about how she ought to 
now believe causally determine how she actually now believes to which the immediate 
causal impact account of doxastic control appeals.  Some proponents of the immediate 
causal impact account suggest that a believer exercises doxastic control because her 
judgments about how she ought to believe in a particular set of circumstances causally 
determine the content of her belief in those circumstances.  On this sort of proposal, a 
believer’s normative judgment about whether it would be rational or justified to now 
believe a particular proposition P on the basis of her current perceptual experience, the 
other beliefs she now has, etc. causes her to have a belief with P as its content.8  There are 





What unifies these models is that, on each, the subject’s judgments about whether she 
ought to now believe that P exerts causal power directly on her current belief.  So, when a 
believer exercises doxastic control over her beliefs, the fact that she forms a judgment 
about what content she ought to believe in a particular case is sufficient to cause her to 
believe that content in that case. 
Other proponents of the immediate causal impact account maintain, however, 
that it is the causal upshot of a believer’s normative judgments about how she ought now 
to regulate her beliefs (and not her judgments about what particular contents her beliefs 
ought now to have) that determine whether or not a believer exercises doxastic control in 
                                                
8 Scanlon (1998) and McDowell (1994) both appear to endorse versions of this account—call it the reflective 
control account—of the relevant causal mechanism.  David Owens also reads Korsgaard as endorsing a 
version of account, but I think that, in fact, what Korsgaard says in her (1996) does not clearly distinguish 
between the reflective control account and what I call the constitution account below.  In later work 
Korsgaard more clearly rejects the reflective control account in favor of the constitution account.  More 
recently, Shah (ms.) seems to suggest that he favors the reflective control account, where a second-order 
reflective state directly causes first-order belief, over the account of this mechanism that I consider next. 
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believing.9 On this proposal, a believer exercises doxastic control when her judgment that 
she ought now to believe truly or in a way that conforms with some other, perhaps more 
narrowly specified, epistemic norms modulates the cognitive processes (i.e. the, perhaps 
subconscious, reasoning) that now generate and/or sustain her belief.  Suppose, for 
example, a believer judges that she ought not believe that P in the circumstances with 
which she is currently faced unless her total evidence makes it probable that P is true.  
Assuming this believer exercises doxastic control in the case at hand, her judgment must 
be causally efficacious in shaping the character of the processing which actually gives rise 
to and/or sustains a belief about whether P in the circumstances at hand such that that 
she only ends up believing that P (rather than suspending or disbelieving that P) if she 
takes her total evidence to make P probable.  Her judgment must cause it to be the case 
that only considerations this believer takes to make P probable will actually give rise to or 
sustain (by serving as the basis for) her belief that P in the circumstances at hand.   
We can model the this mechanism as follows.   
 
 
Here, the relevant sort of judgment exerts its causal power directly on the cognitive 
processing that gives rise to and/or sustains belief in the circumstances at hand and so 
only indirectly on the content of the resulting belief.  
 Regardless of which of these mechanisms the proponent of the immediate causal 
impact account endorses, however, the psychology of a believer who exercises doxastic 
control in believing that P in a particular set of circumstances must be such that, were she 
to have made the relevant sort of normative judgment, this normative judgment would 
have causally determined how she actually believes in the circumstances at hand.  So, on 
the immediate causal impact account whether a believer exercises doxastic control is 
fundamentally a matter of whether she is wired up, so to speak, in the right sort of way.  
We exercise doxastic control in now believing as we do when we are psychologically 
constituted such that any judgments about how we ought now to believe that we happen 
to make will be causally efficacious either in shaping the processes that now give rise to 
and sustain belief or in determining the content of what we now believe. And so, if the 
immediate causal impact account is right, then we are appropriately subject to 
prescriptive epistemic evaluation for believing as we do in the particular set of 
circumstances with which we are now faced because we are capable of immediately 
causally determining how we believe in the circumstances with which we are now faced 
by making a judgment about how we ought to believe in those circumstances. 
                                                
9 In their (2005), Shah and Velleman seem to presuppose that we exercise something like this kind of 
control over our beliefs.  Sosa (forthcoming) also seems to endorse a version of this sort of mechanism as the 
mechanism of doxastic control. 
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2. Why the Immediate Causal Impact Account Fails 
Despite its intuitive appeal, the immediate causal impact account of doxastic 
control is untenable.  And this is because the immediate causal impact account 
implausibly restricts the scope of prescriptive epistemic evaluation.   
In cases where we believe rationally, our judgments regarding how we ought to 
believe cannot exert their causal power over how we actually believe in the way that the 
immediate causal impact account of doxastic control describes.10  Thus, endorsing the 
immediate causal impact account commits one to denying that we exercise doxastic 
control when we believe rationally, and so denying that we are appropriately subject to 
genuinely prescriptive epistemic evaluation for believing in a great many of the cases in 
which it seems that we are.  But it seems that we are appropriately subject to prescriptive 
epistemic evaluation for believing as we do in cases where we believe rationally.  
It will be easier to bring out precisely why an immediate causal impact account of 
doxastic control entails that we do not exercise doxastic control when we believe 
rationally by considering a concrete case.  To this end, imagine that I look out of my 
office window and see that the pavement is wet, that the sky is gray, and that the trees are 
dripping.  I find myself believing, on the basis of my visual experience, that it has 
rained.11  Since I have no reason to think that my visual experience is misleading with 
respect to the recent weather, my belief is both rational and justified.  And I am 
epistemically praiseworthy for believing as I do.  I form my belief about whether it has 
rained in this case in precisely the way that I (epistemically) ought to form such beliefs on 
the basis of my visual experiences.  Moreover, the kind of praise to which I seem 
appropriately subject in this case is not merely evaluative.  The claim that I ought now to 
believe in the way that I do does not merely report that I now believe in a way that 
conforms to epistemic standards, nor does it function exclusively as a kind of sticker of 
approval.  Rather, it would be natural to interpret this positive evaluation as instructing 
me to continue to sustain my belief in the way that I currently do, as advising me to go on 
believing that is has rained on the basis of my visual experience just as I do now, and 
perhaps even as directing me to form beliefs in similar ways in future situations.  And, as 
such, this evaluation is (or, at the very least, it can be) genuinely prescriptive in 
character.12    
                                                
10 The arguments in defense of this conclusion that I offer below are inspired by and loosely track reasoning 
that David Owens puts forward in Chapter 2 of Owens (2000).  A somewhat similar sort of argumentative 
line (marshaled in support of the claim that following an epistemic rule cannot be understood in terms of 
the believer having an intentional state representing the relevant rule that explains—causally—and 
rationalizes the believer’s believing in the way that she does) runs through Boghossian (2008).  
11 Nothing in what follows turns on the fact that this case involves perceptual belief.  The same points might 
be made by appeal to a case involving, for example, a simple deductive inference. 
12 If I believed that it had not, in fact, rained, but rather that the view through my office window had been 
carefully manipulated to make it appear as if it had rained—perhaps I believe that the window has been 
given a gray tint and that the area outside has been sprayed with a fire hose by mischievous students who 
hope to mislead me regarding today’s weather—then, given how unlikely I know this all is, I would be 
appropriately subject to epistemic criticism.  Epistemic norms dictate that, in light of what else I know, I 
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Since being subject to prescriptive epistemic evaluation entails that one exercises 
doxastic control, it must be that I exercise doxastic control in believing that it has rained 
in the case at hand.  And if the immediate causal impact account is right, then exercising 
doxastic control in now believing that it has rained requires that, were I to make a certain 
sort of judgment about how I ought to believe in the circumstances with which I am 
faced, my judgment would cause how I actually believe in the circumstances at hand to 
conform to the way in which I judge that I ought to now believe.  However, there is good 
reason to think that my judgments about how I ought to believe in the circumstances with 
which I am now faced cannot be causally efficacious in this way.  There is good reason to 
think, that is, that my judgments about how I ought to believe in the circumstances with 
which I am now faced cannot causally determine either the character of my current 
reasoning or the content of my current belief.  And this is because a closer look at what 
believing rationally requires reveals that judgments about how one ought to believe in the 
circumstances with which I am faced cannot play either of these causal roles in generating 
or sustaining a rational belief.  It will be helpful treat the two different mechanisms of 
immediate causal impact that I discuss above in turn.    
On the first proposal, I exercise doxastic control in believing, on the basis of my 
visual experience as of gray sky, wet pavement, and dripping trees, just in case, were I to 
judge that I ought to believe that P in the circumstances with which I am now faced, my 
judgment would cause me to believe that P.  Imagine that, as I have a visual experience as 
of a gray sky, wet pavement, and dripping trees outside my office window, I judge that I 
ought now, on the basis of my experience, believe that it has rained.  Can it be that my 
judgment is that which causes me to believe that it has rained in the circumstances at 
hand?  Well, it would, of course, be possible for me to me to believe rationally in the 
circumstances with which I am now faced, even if I had not made this judgment.  Thus, it 
must be that my visual experience (perhaps along with certain of my background beliefs) 
is sufficient to serve as the rational basis and so as the causal ground for my belief that it 
has rained in this case.  Whether or not I make the relevant sort of judgment, my visual 
experience and my background beliefs can do all the causal work that there is to be done 
in generating and sustaining my belief that it has rained in the circumstances at hand.  
Now, certainly there would be something wrong with me, at least epistemically 
speaking, were I to judge that I ought now believe that it has rained and yet now fail to so 
believe.  But the best explanation for this is not that, if I am to believe rationally in a case 
where I make the relevant judgment, then my belief that it has rained must be a causal 
product of my judgment that I ought to now so believe.  Rather, it seems that, at least 
when all goes well, my belief and my judgment share a common causal ground.  If my 
judgment is well-founded, then it seems my normative judgment must itself be grounded 
                                                                                                                                            
ought not to have taken seriously the possibility that my visual experience as of wet pavement, gray sky, etc. 
was the result of an elaborate hoax in this way when forming my belief.  Moreover, there is no reason to 
think that the criticism to which I am appropriately subject here should not be genuinely prescriptive in 
character.  My colleagues would be warranted in chiding me for failing to draw a reasonable, rational, or 
justifiable conclusion about the weather in response to my visual experience, and it is natural to think that 
their criticism here constitutes advice or guidance to the effect that I should have believed differently in the 
case at hand. 
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on and so be a causal product of the same visual experience (and background beliefs) that 
ground my belief that it has rained.  After all, the reasons that I believe that it has rained 
in the case at hand must include that my perceptual experience is as of the sky being gray, 
the pavement being wet, etc.  And it is for precisely these same reasons that I would be 
right to judge that I ought now to believe that it has rained.  So, if I believe rationally, 
then whatever it is on the basis of which I judge that I ought now to believe that it has 
rained must also be that which explains why I now believe as I do.  And if this is right, 
then there is no reason to think that my judgment figures at all in a causal explanation of 
why I now believe that it has rained.  More generally, in cases where the content of what 
I now believe conforms to my judgment about what I ought now to believe, whatever it is 
that grounds my judgment (and not my judgment itself) will do all the causal work that 
needs to be done in generating or sustaining my belief.  We have good reason to expect, 
then, that a complete causal explanation of the fact that I come to believe as I do in the 
circumstances at hand need not ever mention my judgment that I ought to so believe.  
Thus, it would be unparsimonious at best and over-intellectualizing at worst to suppose 
that my judgment that I ought to believe it has rained is, itself, causally efficacious in the 
relevant way in bringing it about that I believe that it has rained.  Instead, we ought to 
conclude that my judgment is epiphenomenal—a kind of fifth wheel—with respect to the 
causal explanation of how it is that I come to believe as I do in the circumstances at hand.  
And since my judgment cannot be that which causes my belief to have the content that it 
has, I cannot, on the proposal under consideration here, exercise doxastic control in 
believing that it has rained in the circumstances at hand. 
Let us turn, now, to the second proposal regarding the mechanism of immediate 
causal impact that underwrites doxastic control introduced above.  On this proposal, that 
I exercise doxastic control in the case at hand requires that, were I to judge that I ought 
to believe that it has rained only if believing that it has rained constitutes conformity with, 
e.g., a truth norm or with norms of epistemic rationality in the case at hand, my judgment 
would causally determine the character of the cognitive processing (i.e. the, perhaps 
subconscious, reasoning) that gives rise to and sustains my belief that it has rained.  So, 
imagine that, as I look out my office window at the gray sky, wet pavement, and dripping 
trees, I judge that I ought only believe that it has rained on the basis of my visual 
experience if my visual experience makes it probable that it has rained.  If I exercise 
doxastic control in the case at hand, it must be that my judgment causes me to regulate 
my belief in such a way that I only end up believing that it has rained on the basis of my 
visual experience in the case at hand because my visual experience makes it probable that 
it has rained.  Assume that my judgment is correct: were it not the case the my visual 
experience made it probable that it has rained, my belief that it has rained in the 
circumstances at hand would be epistemically irrational.  Thus, if I now believe rationally 
that it has rained on the basis of my visual experience, then it must be that I regulate my 
belief in such a way that I only end up believing that it has rained on the basis of my 
visual experience in the case at hand because my visual experience makes it probable that 
it has rained.  And since it would have been possible for me to believe rationally here 
without having ever made the relevant judgment, there is good reason to think that my 
judgment is not what causes me to regulate my belief in this way.  There must be some 
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causal explanation for why it is that I regulate my belief that it has rained in ways that are 
rational in similar cases where I make no judgments about how I ought to regulate my 
beliefs in the circumstances with which I am faced.  And whatever causal explanation 
there is will apply equally well to the case at hand where I do make a judgment of the 
relevant sort.  This suggests that my judgment that I ought not now believe that it has 
rained on the basis of my visual experience unless my visual experience makes it probable 
that it has rained is not that which causally determines the way in which I regulate my 
belief in the case at hand.  To suppose otherwise would be unparsimonious at best and 
over-intellectualizing at worst.  It seems that my judgment must be a kind of 
epiphenomenon—a fifth wheel—in any causal account of the character of the cognitive 
processing (i.e. the reasoning) that gives rise to and sustains my belief that is has rained.  
And since my judgment cannot be that which causes me to regulate my beliefs in the way 
that I do, I cannot, on the proposal under consideration here, exercise doxastic control in 
believing that it has rained in the circumstances at hand. 
 Regardless of how we describe the particular mechanism of immediate causal 
impact, the immediate causal impact account of doxastic control sets the bar for 
exercising doxastic control too high.  In cases like the one I have described here, a 
believer seems to be appropriately subject to genuinely prescriptive evaluation in virtue of 
how she believes even though the believer’s judgments about how she ought now to 
believe cannot causally determine the character of the belief-regulating processes that give 
rise to or sustain her belief, nor can these judgments causally determine the content of her 
belief.  And, as a result, the immediate causal impact account gets the scope of the 
prescriptive epistemic ‘ought’ wrong by implausibly restricting the set of beliefs over 
which we can exercise doxastic control.  As such, the immediate causal impact account 
lacks the resources to vindicate the prescriptive character of significant portions of our 
evaluative practice in the epistemic domain.13    
3. Laying the Foundation for an Account of Doxastic Control 
Nevertheless, there is something right, I think, about the way that proponents of 
the immediate causal impact account have understood what the task of supplying an 
account of doxastic control involves.  The immediate causal impact account is a natural 
way of developing an intuitively appealing and fundamentally correct line of thought 
regarding what an account of doxastic control will have to look like if it is to do the work 
that it is supposed to do in explaining why epistemic evaluation is appropriately 
prescriptive.  
It is easy enough to imagine the proponent of the immediate causal impact 
account motivating her view in the following way.  Notice that we think a believer is 
appropriately subject to prescriptive epistemic evaluation only if she can follow, respond 
                                                
13 One could, of course, endorse the immediate causal impact account of doxastic control and simply accept 
that the scope of prescriptive epistemic evaluation is much more limited than our evaluative practice 
suggests.  But I take it that, if possible, we ought to avoid this kind of error theoretic account of our 
evaluative practice.  And the reminder of this paper aims to show that avoiding an error theory here is 
possible. 
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to, or be guided by epistemic evaluations that she regards as having merit or as being 
apt.14  And this result raises the following question: how is it possible for the way in which 
a believer actually believes to be responsive to or guided by epistemic evaluation?   
Here is the skeleton of an answer.  Imagine that a believer accepts an epistemic 
evaluation as apt, perhaps by endorsing a normative judgment with the same content as 
the evaluation.15 If this judgment about how the believer ought to believe can shape the 
way in which she actually believes, then the evaluation can get a grip on the way in which 
the believer actually believes via her normative judgment.  As a result, the believer can 
come to conform to the epistemic standards to which the evaluation gives voice.   
The suggestion here is that if a believer takes an epistemic evaluation on board, 
perhaps by making the right sort of normative judgment, then, when all goes well, her 
having taken the evaluation on board will shape the way in which she actually believes 
going forward such that she ends up believing in the way in which the evaluation suggests 
she ought to believe.16,17  And, plausibly, this is just what it takes for it to be the case that 
a believer can respond to and be guided by epistemic evaluation in the way that makes 
such evaluation appropriately prescriptive in character.   
If this answer to the “how is it possible…” question with which we began is at least 
roughly correct, then a believer can follow, respond to, or be guided by epistemic 
evaluations because the way in which she actually believes can be somehow regulated by 
or responsive to her understanding of how she ought to believe.  So, if the fact that a 
                                                
14 Although I will not pursue the thought here, I believe what follows is a natural way of cashing out the 
idea that the prescriptive ‘ought’ (in the domain of epistemology and elsewhere) implies some sort of ‘can.’ 
15 Certain theorists—e.g. Sosa (forthcoming) and Shah (2003)—suggest that the relevant second-order state 
here is not a normative judgment regarding how one ought to believe, but rather an intention to regulate 
one’s beliefs in a certain way (e.g. an intention to believe that P only if P is true).  I ignore this wrinkle in my 
discussion because the success of the arguments both in defense of and against the different accounts of 
doxastic control that I canvas here do not turn on whether we understand the second-order state in 
question as being a normative judgment or an intention or some other sort of state.  
16 This way of putting things might make it seem as if the right place to look for an explanation of the 
prescriptive character of epistemic evaluation is in the literature on rule-following in the epistemic domain.  
However I think, for reasons that are particularly clearly expressed in Boghossian (2008), that attempts to 
explicate our capacity to exercise doxastic control in terms of conventional accounts of our ability to follow 
epistemic rules will not yield fruit.  
17 I take it that the fact that the ways in which we actually believe are somehow coupled to how we think we 
ought to believe partially constitutes, or at the very least helps underwrite, our capacity to believe for, in 
response to, and on the basis of (what we take to be) reasons.  And so, I agree, in the main, with those who 
have suggested that the capacity to exercise doxastic control is bound up with or best understood in terms of 
the capacity to believe for, in response to, or on the basis of what one takes to be reasons (e.g. McHugh 
(2012), (forthcoming) or Boyle (2011), (forthcoming)), or what I take to be the related capacity to settle for 
oneself the question of whether P in a way that makes one answerable (Hieronymi (2006), (2008), (2009)).  
However, I do not regard these views as competitors to the accounts of doxastic control that I canvas here.  
Rather, I take the accounts of doxastic control that I canvas here to provide different ways of spelling out 
part of what it takes to have the capacity to believe for, in response to, or on the basis of (what one takes to 
be) reasons, and/or part of that in virtue of which it makes sense to say that believing that P involves settling 
for oneself the question of whether P.  I hope to explore the connection between the capacity for doxastic 
control and the capacity to respond to reasons in believing in more detail in later work.  
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believer exercises doxastic control is to explain why a believer is appropriately subject to 
prescriptive epistemic evaluation, it follows that exercising doxastic control must involve 
being such that the way in which one actually forms, revises, or sustains one’s beliefs is 
somehow the product of or regulated by one’s own conception of ideal belief formation, 
maintenance, and revision.18  Put differently, a believer exercises doxastic control in 
believing when her understanding of how she ought to believe is coupled to the ways in 
which she actually believes such that she can come to believe in the ways that she thinks 
she ought to believe (at least in part) because she thinks that she ought to believe in those 
ways.  A believer exercises doxastic control when, should she judge that she ought to 
believe in a certain way, her judgment is sufficient on its own to bring the way in which 
she believes closer in line with her conception of the relevant epistemic ideal.  Exercising 
doxastic control involves having capacity to actually believe in the image of how one 
accepts that one ought to believe.  
Of course, this first pass at describing what is involved in exercising doxastic 
control, however intuitively appealing, is too underdeveloped and uninformative to 
underwrite a satisfying explanation of when and why believers are appropriately subject 
to prescriptive epistemic evaluation for believing as they do.  An explanatorily powerful 
account of doxastic control will have to describe the particular mechanism via which how 
a believer actually believes is responsive to or shaped by her conception of the relevant 
epistemic ideals.19  That is, an account of doxastic control will have to spell out the way in 
which a believer’s judgments about how she ought to believe are coupled to the way in 
which she actually believes. And this is precisely what the immediate causal impact 
account purports to do.    
                                                
18 I assume here that a believer’s conception of ideal belief regulation is, at least in paradigmatic cases, 
constituted by her normative judgments about how she ought to believe, and can be given voice by her 
intentions to regulate her beliefs in certain specific ways. 
19 Imagine a believer who believes that ~P and that PvQ, wonders whether Q, and elects to undergo a 
procedure of targeted electromagnetic stimulation that will cause her to form a belief that Q on the basis of 
her beliefs that ~P and that PvQ because she judges that she ought to reason in this way in the 
circumstances at hand.  This believer’s normative judgment about how she ought to reason in the case at 
hand is causally efficacious with respect to the operation of the belief-regulating processes that actually 
generate and sustain her belief that Q. And perhaps this is enough to ensure that the believer is 
appropriately subject to some kind of prescriptive epistemic evaluation for believing as she does.  In cases 
like this one, a believer exercises a kind of control that Hieronymi has helpfully identified as manipulative or 
managerial control in her (2006) or (2008) over how she believes.  I do not mean to deny that we can and 
sometimes do exercise manipulative or managerial control over how we believe.  I do think, however, that 
our evaluative practice presupposes that this is not the only, or even the primary, kind of control that we 
exercise in believing.  And this is because when we employ the prescriptive epistemic ‘ought’ in criticizing 
one another, we often presuppose that we are capable of correcting our belief-regulating practices directly, 
so to speak, without having to manipulate our environment and as soon as we are made aware of the way in 
which we have fallen short of epistemic standards.  In this sense, our evaluative practice presupposes that 
we are equipped with the capacity to exercise doxastic control in virtue of being wired up in the way that 
we are, not in virtue of the contingent features of the environment in which we operate.  Thus, we should 
expect that an account of doxastic control will not be simply an account of our capacity to exercise 
manipulative control over how we believe.  Rather, the mechanism via which our conception of ideal belief 
regulations is coupled to the way in which we actually regulate our beliefs will be tighter and more direct 
than this. 
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There are, however, alternative strategies one might pursue in unpacking this 
coupling metaphor.  An account of doxastic control that spells out the way in which a 
believer’s normative judgments about how she ought to believe are coupled to how she 
actually believes in terms of causal efficacy might well endorse a story of the particular 
causal relationship between how one actually believes, on the one hand, and one’s 
judgment about how one ought to believe, on the other, that differs substantially from the 
one that the immediate causal impact account puts forward.  Or, one might spell out the 
link between a believer’s normative judgments and her actual belief regulation by appeal 
to a metaphysical relation (e.g. constitution) instead of causal efficacy.   
In what follows, I articulate a new kind of causal impact account, according to 
which our normative judgments can shape how we actually believe by influencing which 
belief-regulating dispositions we manifest when we believe, that succeeds where the 
immediate causal impact account fails in capturing the scope of the prescriptive epistemic 
‘ought’.  Finally, I explain why we ought to favor this account—the disposition regulation 
account—over a metaphysical account of doxastic control.       
4. Coupling as Deferred Causal Impact: The Disposition Regulation 
Account of Doxastic Control 
Let us assume, for the moment, that some sort of causal impact account is right 
and so that it is some kind of causal link between a believer’s judgments about how she 
ought to regulate her beliefs and how she actually regulates her beliefs that constitutes the 
mechanism of doxastic control.  The immediate causal impact account was untenable 
because there is good reason to think that, at least in certain otherwise-ordinary cases—
our judgments about how we ought to believe in the particular set of circumstances with 
which we are currently faced cannot immediately and directly exert causal power on the 
ways in which we actually believe in those circumstances.  Thus, I propose instead that 
our judgments about how we ought to believe can get a causal grip on how we actually 
believe by immediately and directly exerting their causal power in shaping the ways in 
which we are disposed to regulate our beliefs.  In slogan form, I propose that our 
judgments regarding how we ought to believe shape what we might call our cognitive 
characters.  And so, when the way in which we actually believe manifests our cognitive 
characters, our normative judgments shape how we actually believe.20  
Typically, at least, the way in which one believes in any particular set of 
circumstances manifests one’s belief-regulating dispositions.  And, as I’ll argue below, 
there is reason to think that, again, at least typically, a believer’s judgments about how she 
                                                
20 The disposition regulation account does not entail a virtue theoretic account of the structure of epistemic 
standards, and one certainly need not be a virtue epistemologist in order to endorse the disposition 
regulation account of doxastic control.  If fact, none of the accounts of doxastic control that I canvas here 
take a stand on the structure or the content of epistemic standards or norms.  However, the disposition 
regulation account does fit quite naturally with the virtue theoretic approach since it maintains that, in the 
first instance, we exercise doxastic control over our belief-regulating dispositions and so over our cognitive 
characters.  As such, it offers a way of spelling out the mechanism that underwrites the kind of explicitly 
virtue-based account of epistemic responsibility that one finds, for example, in Owens (2000). 
 13 
ought to believe can be causally efficacious all on their own in shaping the way in which 
she is disposed to form, revise, and sustain her beliefs.21  Thus, I propose that a believer 
exercises doxastic control when her judgments about how she ought to believe in 
circumstances similar to those with which she is currently faced are causally efficacious in 
shaping the belief-regulating disposition(s) that she manifests in believing as she now does. 
So, a believer exercises doxastic control in believing that P if and only if she is wired up, 
so to speak, such that her judgments about how she ought to believe in circumstances like 
the ones with which she is now faced have this kind of direct causal impact on the 
strength of the various belief-regulating dispositions that she manifests in now believing 
that P.  According to this account—the disposition regulation account—a believer is 
appropriately subject to prescriptive epistemic evaluation when, were she to make the 
relevant sort of normative judgment, her judgment would exert a kind of causal influence 
over the dispositions that she manifests in believing as she does via strengthening her 
disposition to regulate her beliefs in the way that she judges she ought to regulate her 
beliefs.  If the disposition regulation account is roughly correct, then we exercise doxastic 
control in believing because (i) the ways in which we actually believe manifest our belief-
regulating dispositions and (ii) a complete causal explanation of why it is that we are 
disposed to regulate our beliefs in certain ways and not others cites our understanding of 
the ways in which we ought to regulate our beliefs. 
We can model the mechanism of disposition regulation by normative judgment as 
follows.22 
                                                
21 Of course, there are a slew of background conditions that must obtain if the normative judgment is to 
exert causal power in the way described.  Perhaps the normative judgment will not be causally efficacious in 
shaping how the believer is disposed to form, revise, and sustain her beliefs if, just as the believer makes the 
normative judgment, she has a seizure, or sustains a serious brain injury, or if a mad scientist uses a small 
electrode to stimulate the believer’s brain in a certain particular way, etc.  Certainly the ‘all on its own’ 
language that I employ here and below is not meant to suggest otherwise.  This language is only meant to 
mark that, unlike when Pascal’s judgment that he ought to believe that God exists causes him to so believe 
(by first causing him take actions that he knows will result in his acquiring the belief in question), there is 
nothing that a believer must do, no further action that the believer must take, for her normative judgment 
to be causally efficacious in the way described.    
22 This model is not the only way to model disposition regulation by normative judgment.  What is essential 
to the disposition regulation account of doxastic control is just that a believer’s normative judgment is 
immediately causally efficacious in shaping the believer’s belief-regulating dispositions, but not in shaping 
the believer’s current beliefs (although, as I explain below, the believer’s normative judgment will have a 
kind of deferred causal impact on her beliefs by shaping the belief-regulating dispositions that give rise to 




The bottom-most horizontal arrow in this diagram represents the way in which certain of 
the subject’s particular perceptual experiences and other beliefs serve as the basis or 
grounds for belief about whether P in an actual or hypothetical case.  Put in other terms, 
this arrow represents the cognitive processing that actually or hypothetically causes or 
sustains belief about whether P on the basis of Input1, …, Inputn.  In reflecting on a 
particular cognitive transition or pattern of reasoning, a believer might judge it to be 
epistemically required, epistemically permissible, or epistemically forbidden.  And should 
she so judge, this normative judgment will affect the strength of her corresponding belief-
regulating disposition.  So on the disposition regulation account, exercising doxastic 
control in believing that P involves it being the case that one’s normative judgments about 
how one ought now to regulate one’s beliefs in response to these inputs (i.e. perceptual 
experiences, other beliefs, etc.) shapes how one’s cognitive system is disposed to translate 
inputs sufficiently similar to Input1, …, Inputn into belief going forward.  When the way 
in which a believer believes manifests belief-regulating dispositions the strength of which 
can be influenced by the believer’s normative judgments in the way described here, the 
believer exercises doxastic control in believing as she does. 
If the disposition regulation account is right, then one can follow instructions or 
advice regarding how to regulate one’s beliefs because one’s judgments about how one 
ought to believe can be (in part) causally responsible for what one actually believes. As 
such, the kind of causal link to which the disposition regulation account appeals supplies 
us with a natural way of understanding what it takes for a believer to be responsive to or 
guided by her conception of ideal belief regulation in actually regulating her beliefs.23  On 
the disposition regulation account, however, one’s judgments about how one ought to 
believe can be partially causally responsible for how one actually believes only by being 
partially causally responsible for the disposition to form, revise, and sustain one’s beliefs in 
                                                
23 I suggested above (in note 17) that I think an account of the way in which a believer’s conception of ideal 
belief regulation is coupled to her actual belief regulation ought to help illuminate what it takes to believe 
for, in response to, or on the basis of reasons.  And, although I do not have space to develop the idea here, I 
think the disposition regulation account can also help us understand what is involved in believing in 
response to, for, or on the basis of reasons.  Very roughly, perhaps believing for, in response to, or on the 
basis of reasons involves its being the case that the way in which one believes manifests a belief-regulating 
disposition the strength of which itself manifest the causal influence of the believer’s understanding of how 
she ought to believe.  
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certain ways that one manifests in believing.  Thus, in contrast to the immediate causal 
impact account, the disposition regulation account is a deferred causal impact account.  If 
the disposition regulation account is right, then the believer’s normative judgment has no 
immediate causal impact on how she now believes.24 As a result, the disposition 
regulation account escapes the kind of criticism that I have argued undermines the 
immediate causal impact account.  
Furthermore, the disposition account posits that the causal impact that a believer’s 
normative judgments have on the strength of belief-regulating dispositions is entirely 
automatic and unreflective.  This strengthening or weakening effect is not, for example, 
modulated by the believer’s intentional efforts to bring her dispositions in line with her 
normative judgments.  Thus, the disposition regulation account does not objectionably 
over-complicate the cognitive processes that generate, sustain, and revise belief, nor does 
it over-intellectualize the way in which we come to have the belief-regulating dispositions 
or cognitive habits that we have.  
Finally, there is some empirical reason to think that we are actually wired up, so to 
speak, in the way that the disposition regulation account suggests.  Early results in 
psychology on the effectiveness of if-then planning (i.e. planning via implementation 
intention) in shaping future behavioral, affective, and cognitive responses to stimuli 
constitutes some reason to expect that certain sorts of normative judgments can have 
precisely the kind of impact on our belief-regulating dispositions that the disposition 
regulation account proposes.25  These results suggest that if-then plans (e.g. if I find 
cookies in the mail room when I go to get a cup of coffee, then I will not eat them) are 
especially effective in shaping future behavioral, affective, and cognitive responses to 
stimuli because if-then plans forge an associative link between specific stimuli and a target 
response.  Furthermore, researchers suggest that the effect the of this link (or perhaps part 
of what constitutes the associative link itself) is the automatic strengthening of a subject’s 
disposition to respond to the set of stimuli catalogued in the antecedent of the plan in the 
way specified by the consequent.  The more easily identifiable or recognizable and the 
less abstractly specified the relevant inputs and output are, the stronger the strengthening 
effect will be.   
Crucially, judgments regarding how one ought to believe in response to various 
sorts of cognitive inputs are like implementation intentions in the following respect: 
normative judgments regarding how one ought to believe pair a set of inputs to cognitive 
processing with a target output.  One might judge that, for example, if one’s perceptual 
experience represents one’s immediate surroundings as being thus-and-so and 
circumstances are otherwise normal (inputs), one ought to believe that one’s immediate 
surroundings are thus-and-so (target output).  Thus, the effectiveness of if-then planning 
in shaping a subject’s dispositions to respond to stimuli in specific ways constitutes 
                                                
24 And, although I cannot pursue the idea here, it is for this reason that I believe the disposition regulation 
account is well positioned to underwrite an account of epistemic agency that is not vulnerable to the kinds 
of objections that Boyle (2011) raises against “process theories” of epistemic agency. 
25 For a quite comprehensive review of the relevant psychological literature, see Webb, T. L., Schweiger 
Gallo, I., Miles, E., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2012) or Gollwitzer, P. M., & Sheeran, P. (2006).  
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preliminary psychological evidence that a believer’s normative judgments about how she 
ought to regulate her beliefs can directly and automatically shape her belief-regulating 
dispositions.26  
5. Coupling as Causal Impact vs. Coupling as Metaphysical Constitution  
 The disposition regulation account and the immediate causal impact account both 
maintain that the right way to cash out the idea that our normative judgments about how 
we ought to believe are coupled to the way in which we actually believe is to describe a 
mechanism of causal influence that links our normative judgments to how we actually 
believe.  One might think, however, that the sense in which our beliefs are coupled to our 
normative judgments regarding how we ought to believe is metaphysical rather than 
causal.  Perhaps the way in which our normative judgments about how to believe are 
coupled to—and so, in some sense, can guide or shape—how we actually believe, is not 
best understood in terms of our normative judgments somehow exerting causal influence 
over either our belief-regulating processes or over the contents of our beliefs, but rather in 
terms of there being some sort of special metaphysical relationship that links our beliefs to 
our normative judgments about how to believe.  
The constitution account of doxastic control is grounded in precisely this line of 
thought.  According to the constitution account, judging that I ought now believe that P 
constitutively involves actually believing that P.  Believing that P is just part of what is 
involved in making a normative judgment that one ought to now believe that P.27  As a 
result, on the constitution account, it is metaphysically impossible for a believer to judge 
that she ought to believe that P in the circumstances at hand and yet fail to now believe 
that P, because the latter mental attitude partially constitutes the former. 28  Insofar as one 
                                                
26 Furthermore, this research suggests that the normative judgments that will have the most pronounced 
effects on a believer’s belief-regulating dispositions will be normative judgments which link easily 
recognizable inputs with a specific target output (e.g. if sky is gray, the pavement is wet, and the trees are 
dripping and one’s circumstances are otherwise normal, then one ought to believe that it has rained).  
27 If one thinks, as I do, that there could be believers who lack the capacity to make normative judgments 
about their own mental attitudes, then one must deny the converse constitution claim (i.e. the claim that a 
belief that P is partially constituted by a normative judgment that one ought now to believe that P).  
However, one might think that our capacity for belief (understood as an essentially rational capacity, and, at 
least in this regard, as being fundamentally different from any capacity that non-rational animals might 
have) and our capacity to make normative judgments about our own mental attitudes are metaphysically 
bound together.  Put differently, one might think that our capacity to make normative judgments about 
how we ought to believe fundamentally alters the nature of our capacity to believe.  And if something along 
these lines is right, then it is plausible that, at least for believers like us, both the original constitution claim 
and its converse hold: a normative judgment that one ought now to believe that P partially constitutes one’s 
belief that P and vice versa.  On this sort of view, believing that P on some particular basis and judging that 
one ought to believe that P on that very basis constitute a kind of metaphysical package: the belief partially 
constitutes the normative judgment and the normative judgment partially constitutes the belief.  I think it is 
most charitable to read Boyle (forthcoming), (2011) and Korsgaard (2006) as endorsing just this kind of 
view.  
28 An account of the metaphysical link that connects first-order beliefs and normative judgments about how 
we ought to believe according to which a normative judgment that one ought now to believe that P partially 
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judges that one ought now believe that P, it is metaphysically guaranteed that one also 
now believes that P.  And it is this fact, according to the constitution account, that 
underwrites one’s capacity to follow or be guided by instructions or advice regarding how 
to reason that one accepts as apt.  So, the fact that our beliefs are coupled to our 
normative judgments via constitution explains why we are appropriately subject to 
genuinely prescriptive epistemic evaluation.  
We can model what, according to the constitution account, exercising doxastic 
control involves as follows.  
 
So, why favor a causal impact account—and, in particular, the disposition 
regulation account—over the constitution account?  Let me be clear: I offer no argument 
here against the claim that a believer’s belief that P partially constitutes her normative 
judgment that she ought now to believe that P.  For all I say below, it may well be that 
our normative judgments about how we ought now to believe are partially constituted by 
our first-order beliefs in just the way that a proponent of the constitution account 
suggests.29  Nevertheless, I think we have good reason to reject the constitution account of 
doxastic control.   
Here is why.  Notice that we are appropriately subject to genuinely prescriptive 
praise or criticism in virtue not only of how we believe, but also how we intend, hope, 
fear, anger, etc.  We think that one is reasonable, rational, or justified in intending, 
hoping, fearing, feeling pride, or feeling anger as a result of and in response to certain 
sorts of mental inputs, but not others.  We think, for example, that one ought to intend to 
φ as a result of and in response to having certain combinations of beliefs and values or 
ends, but not as a result of and in response to having other combinations of beliefs and 
values or ends.  And when we praise or criticize one another for intending, hoping, or 
                                                                                                                                            
constitutes one’s belief that P, but one’s belief that P does not partially constitute one’s normative judgment 
that one ought to now believe that P will not be able to explain why it is that we are capable of following the 
instructions, directions, or advice embedded in prescriptive epistemic evaluation.  This is because we 
accept, internalize, or take up instructions or advice by making a normative judgment.  And so a 
metaphysical connection between normative judgment and belief can only explain why we are capable of 
following or being guided by instructions or advice that we regard as apt if making a normative judgment 
metaphysically guarantees that we believe in accordance with the judgment that we make.  The thesis that 
one’s belief that P partially constitutes one’s normative judgment that one ought now to believe that P can 
underwrite this metaphysical guarantee.  The thesis that a normative judgment that one ought now to 
believe that P partially constitutes one’s belief that P, however, cannot.   
29 One might worry that the constitution account is obviously false since I can judge that I ought to believe 
that P because I am being offered a reward and yet fail to so believe.  But this is too quick.  The normative 
judgments to which the constitution account is meant to apply involve the epistemic ‘ought,’ and it is far less 
clear that one can judge that one epistemically ought to believe that P and yet fail to believe that P. 
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fearing in certain ways, our praise or criticism is often instructive or directive in character.  
Evaluations with respect to the various different standards of rationality, reasonableness, 
or justification that govern the ways in which we regulate the various different sorts of 
mental attitudes that we have can be and often are genuinely prescriptive.   
This shows, I think, that there is a broader genus of prescriptive evaluation—I’ll 
call it rational evaluation—of which prescriptive epistemic evaluation is a species.  One is 
appropriately subject to prescriptive rational evaluation in virtue of having a particular 
mental attitude whenever that attitude is of a sort for which one can be appropriately 
asked to provide justifying or rationalizing reasons.  And so, doxastic control (whatever it 
involves) must be a species of a more general type of control—I’ll call it rational control—
that explains when and why individuals are appropriately subject to prescriptive 
evaluation with respect to the norms of rationality or justification that govern how we 
form, revise, and maintain the various different sorts of mental attitudes that we have.  
We ought to be able to generalize an account of doxastic control—an account of the link 
between a believer’s normative judgments regarding how she ought to believe and how 
she actually believes—to generate an account of rational control that can explain when 
and why all sorts of rational evaluation are prescriptive.  I argue below that we ought to 
favor the disposition regulation account of doxastic control over the constitution account 
of doxastic control because the former can be naturally extended to provide a unified 
account of rational control and the latter cannot.30 
The reason that the constitution account of doxastic control cannot supply a 
unified account of rational control is that, even assuming it is plausible that one’s 
normative judgment that one ought now to believe that P is constitutively linked to one’s 
belief that P, it is not at all plausible that one’s normative judgment that one ought now to 
have a certain mental state (e.g. an intention to φ, a wish or hope that P, a fear of X) is 
constitutively linked to the first-order mental state that one’s normative judgment is 
about.  Focus on the case of intention for a moment. If I judge that, given how 
desperately I want to stick to my diet, I ought to intend to refrain from eating the scoop 
ice cream that has been put in front of me, I may, nevertheless, find myself quite 
intentionally digging in.  And I might well intend to have another serving of ice cream 
when I am through, while judging that I ought not so intend.  Cases like these suggest 
that it is possible to make a normative judgment that one ought, in the circumstances at 
hand, intend to φ, and yet fail to now intend to φ, and that it is possible to intend to φ 
                                                
30 Either a reflective control account or a reflective guidance account of the mechanism of rational control 
might seem promising, at least at first pass, as applied to the cases of intention, hope, fear, etc.  David 
Owens, for example, endorses a reflective control account of the kind of control we exercise in intending, 
although he denies that we have the capacity for reflective control over our beliefs. Perhaps he is right that 
our intentions are responsive to our normative judgments in just the way that a reflective control model 
suggests.  Nevertheless, since neither reflective control nor reflective guidance provides a suitable model of 
doxastic control, to adopt either sort of account as an account of rational control amounts to rejecting that there 
is a unified account of rational control and so a unified explanation of when and why subjects are 
prescriptively evaluable in believing and in intending, hoping, fearing, etc.  In light of the apparent unity in 
the phenomena to be explained, giving up on supplying a unified account here should be viewed as a kind 
of last resort, one that this section shows there is no need to pursue. 
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without judging that one ought now intend to φ.31,32   But if the normative judgment that 
one ought now to intend to φ is not necessarily accompanied by the intention to φ, then it 
cannot be that an intention to φ partially constitutes this judgment.  And if one’s intention 
to φ is not necessarily accompanied by the normative judgment that one ought now so 
intend, then this judgment cannot partially constitute the intention to φ.   
We cannot explain why agents are often appropriately subject to prescriptive 
rational evaluation in virtue of how they intend by understanding the link between an 
agent’s normative judgments and her intentions in terms of constitution, because it is 
implausible that an agent’s normative judgments and her intentions are actually 
metaphysically linked in this way.33  If we accept the constitution account of doxastic 
control, then we must also accept that there is no unified explanation of when and why 
we are subject to prescriptive rational evaluation for regulating the various different sorts 
of mental attitudes that we have in the ways that we do.   
However, the disposition regulation account of doxastic control can be naturally 
extended to supply a unified account of rational control, and so to underwrite a unified 
explanation of the (sometimes) prescriptive character of rational evaluation of various 
different mental attitude types.  Let us focus again on intention.  Imagine I judge that I 
ought to intend to perform M when I adopt a particular end E, and believe that 
performing a particular action M constitutes a necessary means to achieving E.  If I 
exercise rational control in intending, then according to the disposition regulation 
account of rational control, my normative judgment will be sufficient on its own to 
strengthen my disposition to intend to perform actions that I believe to be the necessary 
means to my various ends.  Put in other terms, my normative judgment that I ought to 
form intentions in response to my beliefs and my ends in a way that corresponds to the 
pattern of reasoning described here itself strengthens my disposition to form intentions in 
precisely this way.  And if I judge often enough that I ought to regulate my intentions in a 
                                                
31 It is perhaps natural to think that something like what I describe here is precisely what is going on in cases 
of practical akrasia, but I mean to remain agnostic regarding whether or not this is the right way of 
understanding that phenomenon.  Regardless, what I describe here seems to be possible, and that is enough 
for the present argument.   
32 Perhaps the proponent of a constitution account might respond as follows in an effort to rescue her view: 
in the first of these cases, I intend both to eat the ice cream and to refrain from eating the ice cream; in the 
second, I judge both that I ought and that I ought not to have another scoop.  However, this way of 
interpreting what is going on in these cases is in conflict with the phenomenology of the agent.  If asked in 
the second case whether I think that I ought to intend to have a second scoop of ice cream, I might respond 
by saying, “of course not!  I know that I’ll feel sick if I have another scoop!  I’m standing in line for another 
scoop because I intend to have one even though I know that I ought not.  I wish that I could give up my 
intention to have another scoop, but alas, I am overcome by temptation.” At the very least, considerations 
of simplicity and parsimony tell against interpreting the cases in the way suggested here, and so, without 
independent motivation, this move is ad hoc at best.  
33 It is even less plausible, I think, that one’s normative judgments regarding what one ought to fear are 
constitutively linked to one’s fears, or that one one’s normative judgments regarding in virtue of what one 
ought to feel pride are constitutively linked to feeling proud.     
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way that corresponds to this pattern of regulation, I will develop a strong standing 
disposition to regulate my intentions in just this way.   
The psychological results that I discuss above lend support to the thesis that we 
are wired up, so to speak, just as the disposition regulation account suggests, just as much 
in the case of intention as in the case of belief.  So it is plausible that my normative 
judgments are causally efficacious with respect to my intention-regulating dispositions in 
precisely this way.  And, just as in the case of belief, the fact that they are is enough to 
ensure that I can, in the relevant sense, follow instructions or directives regarding how to 
form, revise, and sustain my intention.  If I judge that I ought to intend to perform M 
when I adopt a particular end E, and believe that performing a particular action M 
constitutes a necessary means to achieving E, then (assuming I have the capacity for 
rational control) just by making this judgment, I am on my way toward developing a 
standing disposition to form intentions in a way that conforms with my judgment about 
how I ought to intend.  If an agent who exercises rational control over how she intends 
takes up the instructions embedded in a bit of rational praise or criticism by judging that 
she ought to regulate her intentions in the way that these instructions describe, the way in 
which she actually intends going forward will have been guided by these instructions.  
Thus, if the disposition regulation account is right, then the fact that an agent can 
exercise rational control in intending is enough to explain why she is appropriately 
subject to genuinely prescriptive evaluation for intending as she does.    
As such, a disposition regulation account of rational control is well suited to 
explain when and why we appropriately take each other to be targets of genuinely 
prescriptive evaluation with respect to standards of rationality or justification in intending.  
And there is no reason to doubt that an analogous explanation of when and why we 
appropriately take each other to be targets of genuinely prescriptive rational evaluation in 
virtue of how we regulate various other sorts of mental attitudes that we have is in the 
offing.34  Thus, the disposition regulation account is especially well positioned to 
underwrite a unified account of when and why we are appropriate targets of prescriptive 
evaluation in virtue of how we form, revise, and sustain the range of different types of 
mental attitudes that we are capable of having.35 
                                                
34 Although I do not have space here for a detailed discussion of this point, I think it is quite plausible that 
we enjoy different degrees of rational control over our different types of mental attitudes.  Perhaps, for 
example, we are more capable of exercising rational control in believing and intending than in fearing, 
wishing, or angering.  If this is right, then we have yet another reason to favor a disposition regulation 
account over a constitution account of rational control: the kind of strengthening effect to which a 
disposition regulation account appeals might well take on different magnitudes in cases involving different 
mental attitude types, but constitution cannot come in degrees.      
35 Although a full treatment of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe that a disposition 
regulation account of rational control can also supply a satisfying explanation of when and why individuals, 
as well as group agents (a board of directors, a government agency, etc.), are subject to genuinely 
prescriptive evaluation with respect to standards of rationality or justification in virtue of how they act.  
Notice that this is precisely what we should expect if, as I suggest above in notes 17 and 23, an account of 
this sort of control helps to explain what it takes to be reasons-responsive, since both individuals and group 
agents are typically responsive to reasons in acting.  
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Conclusion  
Here is an intuitively appealing thought about what is required for a believer to 
have the capacity to be guided by instructions regarding how to believe: a believer is 
capable of responding to instructions or directions regarding how she ought to believe 
because the way in which she actually forms, revises, and maintains her beliefs is 
somehow coupled to and can be regulated by her own conception of how she ought to 
form, revise, and maintain her beliefs.  Plausibly, then, it is this link between a believer’s 
conception of ideal belief regulation and her actual belief regulation that constitutes her 
capacity to exercise doxastic control.  The mechanism of doxastic control is just the 
mechanism via which a believer’s conception of ideal belief regulation is coupled to the 
ways in which she actually regulates her beliefs. 
The immediate causal impact account, the disposition regulation account, and the 
constitution account are all inspired by and best understood as attempts to flesh out this 
foundational thought.  I argue, however, that the disposition regulation account is better 
positioned than its competitors to supply a satisfying explanation of when and why it is 
that believers are appropriately subject to prescriptive epistemic evaluation for believing 
as they do.  The immediate causal impact account rightly cashes out the link between a 
believer’s normative judgments regarding how she ought to believe and the way in which 
she actually believes in terms of a kind of causal impact that the former have on the latter.  
But the immediate causal impact account is committed to an implausibly immediate 
model of this causal connection.  Thus, the disposition regulation account, according to 
which a believer’s normative judgments regarding how she ought to believe have a kind 
of deferred causal impact on how she actually believes, succeeds where the immediate 
causal impact account fails in explaining the scope of prescriptive epistemic evaluation.  
Furthermore, the disposition regulation account can underwrite a plausible and unified 
explanation of when and why evaluation with respect to the different standards of 
rationality, justification, or reasonableness that govern our various different types of 
mental attitudes is prescriptive, while the constitution account cannot.36  
 
                                                
36 I am especially grateful to Matthew Kotzen, Lisa Miracchi, Ram Neta, Blake Roeber, Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord, Nishiten Shah, Susanna Siegel, Ernest Sosa, Kurt Sylvan, and Vida Yao for their feedback on 
earlier drafts of this piece. 
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